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When retailers are privately informed about relevant aspects of their market, the wedge between
wholesale prices and marginal costs results from the fundamental trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and
rent extraction that uninformed manufacturers face when designing (non-linear) wholesale contracts.
To save on information rents, manufacturers must cut back the supply of intermediate inputs,
whereby generating upward price distortions that penalize ￿nal consumers.
Building on this insight, a recent strand of the vertical contracting literature has shown that
retail price restrictions improve manufacturers￿pro￿ts under asymmetric information. Indeed, by
allowing better inference on the retailers￿private information, vertical price control mitigates the
negative incentive e⁄ects that ￿ ow from a non-linear transfer scheme. Hence, manufacturers reach
a better position when trading o⁄ extraction of their retailers￿information rent and e¢ ciency. This
bene￿ts consumers because of lower input supply distortions and, thus, less double marginalization:
a view in line with the Chicago School stance arguing in favor of vertical price control.1
The agency approach taken in these papers is supported by a large and growing empirical
literature that has documented a number of regularities consistent with the predictions of the
basic principal-agent theory ￿ see, e.g., Lafontaine and Slade (1997). However, existing models
mainly consider a bilateral monopoly framework where each manufacturer/retailer pair is taken in
isolation. They are thus mute on how their predictions carry over in more competitive contexts
where di⁄erent manufacturer/retailer pairs compete and each downstream ￿rm exerts non-market
externalities on its competitors. Such investigation is clearly of prime importance to put policy
recommendations on ￿rmer foundations. Lafontaine and Slade (1997), for instance, pointed out
that the standard agency model applied to vertical contracting deceptively fails to account for the
fact that each manufacturer/retailer pair operates in a competitive environment, and that decisions
in any such vertical structure have an equilibrium impact on competitors. As a consequence, most
empirical studies rely solely on attributes of the upstream ￿rm and its outlet when evaluating the
costs and bene￿ts of a ban on vertical price control, whereby ignoring potential e⁄ects stemming
from intrabrand competition. Such partial perspective may introduce some signi￿cant bias in the
analysis by erroneously interpreting data and market behavior as coming from isolated choices and
not being the equilibrium outcome of a more complex game.
Introducing competition between manufacturer/retailer pairs and non-market externalities across
retailers not only o⁄ers a more complete picture, but it also raises a number of important questions.
The corresponding answers, as we argue below, are less stark than what is predicted by the bilateral
monopoly model. What are the forces shaping the retail market equilibrium in games with compet-
ing supply chains? Is vertical price control still bene￿cial to consumers? Does the Chicago School
argument apply under these circumstances? What are the empirical variables re￿ ecting interbrand
competition that, in principle, should be used to asses the welfare e⁄ects of RPM?
1See, e.g., Spengler (1950) and Telser (1960).
2The present paper o⁄ers some simple answers to these questions in a tractable, although speci￿c
game between competing manufacturer/retailer pairs. More precisely, we set up an agency model
with linear demands allowing both for adverse selection and moral hazard,2 competing supply chains
and non-market externalities at the downstream level. Retailers privately observe ￿nal demands
and exert nonveri￿able e⁄orts (after-sale services, promotional e⁄orts, advertising etc.) that create
cross-demand externalities. Such externalities can be either positive or negative depending on the
nature of the retailer￿ s activity. Two legal regimes are compared: one where resale price maintenance
is allowed (laissez-faire); the other where this practice is forbidden (ban on RPM).
In this framework, we ￿rst show that equilibrium quantities are lower under laissez-faire than
with a ban on RPM if retailers￿non-market activities create positive externalities ￿ i.e., if an
increase in one retailer￿ s e⁄ort also improves his competitors￿demand. Instead, the opposite con-
clusion obtains with negative externalities. Building on this comparison of outputs, we then show
that manufacturers and consumers might have con￿ icting views about the opportunity of banning
vertical price control. Consumers prefer RPM if and only if non-market externalities are nega-
tive whereas manufacturers achieve in some cases higher equilibrium pro￿ts with RPM even with
positive non-market externalities.
To gain some intuition on why this additional instrument would always be chosen by manufac-
turers in equilibrium, note ￿rst that, whatever other supply chains are doing and whether these
pairs are using RPM or not, a given manufacturer would always want to expand the means of
controlling his retailer, so as to limit his information rent. Using both controls ￿ i.e., on retail
price and output ￿ allows indeed to better track the retailer￿ s e⁄ort which, in turn, sti￿ es his
rent. When comparing equilibrium pro￿ts with and without a ban on RPM, this e⁄ect drives the
manufacturers￿preferences over those regimes.
The existence of a possible con￿ ict between consumers and manufacturers is due to the interplay
between non-market externalities, competition between supply chains and asymmetric information.
In the case of a bilateral monopoly, and much in line with the Chicago School dogma, manufacturers￿
and consumers￿preferences are instead aligned over the choice of contractual modes ￿ see, e.g.,
Gal-Or (1991a) and Martimort and Piccolo (2007). From a competition policy viewpoint, this
underscores the scarce appeal of per se rules in markets where interbrand competition is non-
negligible and promotional activities play a substantial role in determining ￿nal demands.
Put di⁄erently, our model is simple enough to drive all the output and welfare comparisons
between contracting modes from the sole analysis of the nature of non-market externalities and
its consequences on competition between vertical structures, keeping as a reference point the case
2This model has been a work-horse of the earlier literature on vertical control under adverse selection. See for
instance, Gal-Or (1991a, b, 1999), Martimort (1996), Martimort and Piccolo (2010) among others. Note that a model
with linear demands and with demand shocks being uniformly distributed as we assume below can also be viewed as
a correct approximation of some more general nonlinear demand systems when uncertainty of demand parameters is
not too large. This alternative approach certainly broadens the scope of our analysis.
3where, in the absence of any such externalities, the two modes would be equivalent.3 Even if derived
in a simpli￿ed setting, these predictions are novel in the vertical contracting literature. Since our
predictions on when retail price restrictions are more likely to harm consumers are based only on
the sign of the non-market externality, they provide a ready-to-use tool for policy.
In view of this result, our model is also particularly relevant to assess the existing limits of
some recent empirical works and where further such works should be heading. The importance
of promotional e⁄ort in manufacturer/retailer relationships is indeed documented by an expanding
body of empirical studies. However, these papers often fail to account for the cross-demand ex-
ternalities that such non-market activities may generate ￿ see, e.g., Lafontaine and Slade (1997).
For instance, when respectively studying resale price maintenance in the French retail market for
bottled water and in the German co⁄ee market, Bonnet and Dubois (2010), Bonnet, Dubois and
Simioni (2006) and Bonnet, Dubois and Villas Boas (2009), account for the extent of retailers￿pro-
motional activities ￿ such as brand image conveyed through advertising ￿ but do not explicitly
consider cross-demand externalities in their structural models. Our model suggests that the nature
and degree of retailers￿externalities imposed on each other might be an important omitted variable
in these studies which could potentially lead to a bias in the estimates of interest.
To understand the logic behind our results it is worth explaining the source of the agency problem
faced by manufacturers when dealing with retailers who hold private information on demand shocks
and exert nonveri￿able e⁄orts to boost demand. First, a typical wholesale contract asks the retailer
to pay some franchise fee to get access to the right of selling the manufacturer￿ s product. When the
bargaining power is on the manufacturers￿side, this fee extracts as much pro￿ts as possible from the
retailer, although he can still pocket an information rent. Of course, this payment is smaller when
demand is low and downstream pro￿t small. Precisely this wedge creates incentives for a retailer
to pretend that downstream demand is lower than it really is. By doing so, he would pay a lower
amount and grasp some information rent.
Di⁄erences in contractual modes signi￿cantly a⁄ect the rent grasped by the retailer at equilib-
rium. Consider, for instance, a situation where RPM is banned. First, retailers enjoy higher rents
relative to the laissez-faire regime. Indeed, with such a limited control, a manufacturer is unable to
decipher and control the non-veri￿able e⁄ort of his retailer towards improving own demand from
observed contractual variables like retail prices and input sales. Retailers have now enough freedom
in choosing this e⁄ort and fully internalize its impact on pro￿ts. Conditionally on a given wholesale
contract, the retailer￿ s e⁄ort is e¢ cient from the point of view of the manufacturer-retailer pair: a
demand-enhancing e⁄ect that pushes e⁄ort up. Second, boosting own demand makes it also more
valuable for a retailer to manipulate his private information on demand. Extracting the retailer￿ s
information rent requires stronger distortions of the wholesale contract, which reduces the retailer￿ s
3More complex speci￿cations of demand, information structures and disutility functions could start by already
introducing a bias towards one contractual mode versus the other even when non-market externalities are absent.
The e⁄ects that we unveil in this paper would superimpose to such analysis to attenuate or reinforce the comparison
between those modes.
4demand and in turn dampens the level of his non-veri￿able e⁄ort: a rent-extraction e⁄ect that
decreases e⁄ort. Third, with competing supply chains, there is also a horizontal externality e⁄ect:
changing one retailer￿ s e⁄ort has a direct impact on the competitor￿ s demand, and this e⁄ect might
back￿re into the retail market equilibrium outcome. Essentially, depending on the sign of the retail
non-market externalities the downstream game may feature either strategic complementarities or
substitutabilities in e⁄ort ￿ i.e., increasing e⁄ort by one retailer also leads to an increase (resp.
decrease) in his competitor￿ s e⁄ort.
In the model that we develop below demand is linear and the disutility of e⁄ort quadratic, so
that the demand-enhancing and the rent-extraction e⁄ects exactly compensate each other. Only
cross-demand externalities matter to assess the impact of each legal regime on the equilibrium
quantities, and therefore on consumer surplus. Following Martimort and Piccolo (2007), we know
that this is precisely with such functional forms that RPM and quantity forcing contracts are just
equivalent when a single manufacturer/retailer pair is active. Hence, these modeling choices allow
us to focus on the novel insights that competition between such pairs may bring to explain the
performances of di⁄erent legal regimes.
If e⁄ort externalities are positive, a ban on RPM spurs equilibrium quantities relative to the
laissez-faire regime. This is because retailers￿equilibrium e⁄ort diminishes under RPM for rent-
extraction reasons, which lowers in turn the rival￿ s e⁄ort and thus own demand via a negative cross-
demand spillover.4 Hence, when non-market externalities are positive a laissez-faire regime limits
the positive complementarities among competing retailers, whereby sti￿ ing equilibrium quantities
and penalizing ￿nal consumers. This also explains why manufacturers￿and consumers￿preferences
might be not aligned in these games: manufacturers prefer vertical price control because it improves
screening, but consumers dislike this practice because it reduces the equilibrium promotional e⁄ort
and therefore quantity.
In contrast, if e⁄ort spillovers are negative, RPM enables manufacturers to limit the negative
externalities between retailers: reducing one retailer￿ s e⁄ort also reduces the rivals￿ e⁄ort, this
mitigates the negative cross-demand externalities so as to promote productive e¢ ciency and bene￿t
consumers.
Our analysis complements earlier contributions on vertical contracting under asymmetric infor-
mation and expands their scope. In a model with adverse selection but without promotional e⁄ort,
Gal-Or (1991a) was the ￿rst to argue that nonlinear wholesale prices might not su¢ ce to elimi-
nate downstream rents and double marginalization. She showed that vertical price control plays a
novel e¢ ciency role. Indeed, it helps manufacturers to better extract retailers￿rents and promote
productive e¢ ciency. While under complete information, there is a priori no feasibility constraints
imposed on the ￿xed-fees that can be used by manufacturers to extract the retailer￿ s downstream
pro￿t, asymmetric information puts such limits on the ability of upstream manufacturers to capture
4In contrast to what could be expected, a wider range of contractual instruments leads to a reduction rather than
to an increase of e⁄ort in our example. The reverse could be possible if e⁄ort were veri￿able.
5downstream pro￿ts.5 Essentially, as long as vertical price ￿xing provides an additional screening
instrument, the retail price comes closer to marginal costs. A laissez-faire approach cannot harm
consumers. In contrast, we show that this simple point may no longer be always true with competing
supply chains. Its validity depends on the nature of e⁄ort externalities across those chains.
Building on Gal-Or (1991a), Martimort and Piccolo (2007) studied contracts with and without
RPM in a bilateral monopoly model where downstream e⁄ort is non-veri￿able and retailers have
private information on demand. They showed that when RPM is privately optimal for the vertical
structure, it also enhances consumer welfare: a result very much in the spirit of the Chicago School
approach. However, their main conclusion depends upon ￿ne details of the marginal disutility
of e⁄ort (its convexity or concavity). One striking result is that the two contractual regimes are
equivalent from the consumer￿ s point of view when the retailer￿ s disutility of e⁄ort is quadratic
and demand is linear. This neutrality is precisely our starting point for introducing competition
between supply chains and test whether their ￿ndings survive with competing supply chains and
e⁄ort externalities. This allows us to nail down an unbiased example where the link between
downstream non-market externalities, consumer surplus and vertical control depends exclusively on
the nature of e⁄ort externalities. Of course, the e⁄ects emphasized here and those underlined in
Gal-Or (1991a) and Martimort and Piccolo (2007), might be at play simultaneously in practice.
However, understanding which of them end up dominating seems an empirical question that is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, it is interesting to compare our result concerning the impact of RPM on retailers￿pro-
motional e⁄ort to the earlier vertical contracting literature that analyzed the role of non-market
externalities. Marvel and McCa⁄erty (1985, 1986), for instance, argued that vertical price con-
trol should enhance e¢ ciency by promoting retailers￿non-market activities. There is one major
di⁄erence between this latter view and ours. While we allow for nonlinear contracts which would
enable manufacturers to internalize all vertical externalities in the case of complete information,
these earlier papers only consider linear prices and arti￿cially created a vertical externality by
imposing this arbitrary restriction. In Marvel and McCa⁄erty (1985, 1986), for instance, the ben-
e￿cial e⁄ect of RPM stems from a simple free-riding argument. In the absence of vertical control,
downstream competition cannot support the e¢ cient provision of services because retailers free-ride
on competitors by reducing the costly non-market services so as to reduce prices and poach com-
petitors￿demand. In equilibrium, the market will be completely dominated by outlets o⁄ering no
service. Minimal retail price requirements, instead, prevent competitive forces from cutting down
those costly non-market services and thus enhance e¢ ciency. The logic of this mechanism relies
5Many scholars have criticized the Chicago school approach by pointing out the arti￿cial nature of double mar-
ginalization in complete information environments. For example, in Blair and Lewis (1994), Kuhn (1997), Gal-Or
(1991a) and (1991b), Martimort and Piccolo (2007), Rey and Tirole (1986), double marginalization is endogenous.
Instead of being inherited from an exogenous constraint on instruments that restricts the manufacturer to impose
linear wholesale pricing, asymmetric information generates distortions which are similar in spirit but those distortions
are now induced by incentive compatibility constraints.
6on the double-marginalization e⁄ect generated by linear pricing: retailers free-ride one on another
because by doing so they can grab market rents. When manufacturers can use two-part tari⁄s,
instead, this is no longer true. Under complete information, the whole downstream surplus can be
extracted with ￿xed fees, retailers are then indi⁄erent between all levels of services and implement
those recommended by the manufacturers. This does not happen in our model where retailers enjoy
information rents and these rents are endogenously derived from the information structure.
Section 2 sets up the model and provides the complete information benchmark. We characterize
the incentive feasible allocations under each legal regime in Section 4. Comparative statics and
welfare results are derived in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses various robustness checks.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Industry. Consider a downstream industry where two retailers, R1 and R2, compete by selling
di⁄erentiated goods (brands). Let qi denote the quantity supplied of this good by Ri on the
￿nal market. The production of each unit of ￿nal output qi requires one unit of an essential raw
input which is supplied by an upstream manufacturer, Mi, each being in an exclusive relationship
with retailer Ri. Let pi(￿;ei;e￿i;qi;q￿i) be the inverse market demand for good i. The common
shock a⁄ecting both downstream demands ￿ is uniformly distributed on the compact support ￿ ￿
[￿;￿], with ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ denoting the spread of demand uncertainty. Retailers privately know the
realization of ￿ at the time contracts are signed. The variable ei denotes a non-veri￿able demand-
enhancing activity (e⁄ort) performed by each retailer Ri. This e⁄ort may generate positive or
negative spillovers on his competitor.
To highlight the e⁄ect of non-market externalities on the retail market equilibrium outcome we
choose the linear speci￿cation:6
pi(￿;ei;e￿i;qi;q￿i) = ￿ + ei + ￿e￿i ￿ qi ￿ ￿q￿i; for each i = 1;2.
The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] is the standard measure of products￿di⁄erentiation. The parameter ￿,
instead, determines whether retailers impose positive (￿ > 0) or negative externalities (￿ < 0) on
each other through their non-market activities. Essentially, the e⁄ort variable is meant to capture
all retailers￿non-market activities which may help retailers to di⁄erentiate their products, e.g.,
production of indivisible services, investments in advertising or pre-sale advices to potential buyers.
6This demand system is generated by a representative consumer whose preferences are quasi-linear and represented

















i ￿ ￿q1q2 + I:
This speci￿cation is standard in IO models ￿ see, e.g., Vives (2000).
7It has two e⁄ects on the demand system: it enhances own consumers￿willingness to pay, but it may
also in￿ uence the competitor￿ s demand. This assumption seems reasonable at least in two cases.
First, when e⁄ort is interpreted as production of indivisible services bundled with the ￿nal product,
it might have a negative impact on competitors￿demand. Di⁄erently, as argued by Mathewson and
Winter (1984), when e⁄ort captures pre-sale services or generic advertising, it could well be the case
that information on the product￿ s existence bene￿ts also competitors: a free-riding story. Following
Che and Hausch (1999), we shall say that e⁄ort has either a cooperative value if ￿ ￿ 0 or a sel￿sh
one if ￿ < 0. We shall also assume that j￿j < 1 in order to guarantee that own-e⁄ort e⁄ects are
larger than cross-e⁄ort ones, i.e., @pi(:)=@ei > j@pi(:)=@e￿ij.
Exerting e⁄ort is costly for retailers and ￿(ei) =  e2
i=2 is the quadratic disutility of e⁄ort
incurred by retailer i. Finally, production technologies are linear for both upstream and downstream
￿rms, and marginal costs are normalized at zero with no loss of generality.
Legal regimes and contracts. The social planner (antitrust or competition authority) chooses
among two possible legal regimes:
￿ Laissez-faire where manufacturers face no restrictions on the type of contracts they can design;
￿ Ban on RPM where retail price restrictions are forbidden.
These regimes capture in the simplest possible way the kinds of vertical price control regulations
that are found in practice. Although the Chicago School critique has often advocated for a laissez-
faire approach towards vertical restraints, by supporting the view that these instruments remove
double marginalization, this practice is generally treated as illegal per se in the U.S. and most
OECD countries.
Accordingly, manufacturers can use two di⁄erent types of vertical contracts depending on the
legal regime that prevails: resale price maintenance (RPM) or quantity forcing (QF) contracts.
Under QF, a contract is a nonlinear tari⁄ti(qi) specifying for any amount qi produced by Ri a ￿xed
fee ti(qi) paid to Mi. When RPM is chosen, a contract is a menu fti(qi);pi(qi)g which now speci￿es
also a retail price pi(qi) to be charged downstream as a function of Ri￿ s output. We follow the earlier
literature7 in assuming that these contracts cannot depend on the output produced by competing
retailers. This incompleteness in contracts can be either due to the fact that manufacturer Mi has
no auditing rights to verify such information, or simply because conditioning the transfer ti (:) on the
rival￿ s output q￿i would be often treated as an anticompetitive practice by an antitrust authority.
The next section describes in more detail how these contracts can be reinterpreted in terms of direct
truthful revelation mechanisms.
Timing and equilibrium concept. The sequence of events unfolds as follows:
T=0. The planner announces a legal regime, laissez-faire or ban on RPM.
7See Gal-Or (1991b, 1999), and Martimort (1996).
8T=1. The demand shock ￿ is realized and only R1 and R2 observe this piece of information.
T=2. Upon observing the announced regime, each manufacturer o⁄ers a menu of contracts to his
retailer. Contracts can be accepted or rejected. If Ri turns down Mi￿ s o⁄er, these two players get
an outside option which, for simplicity, is normalized to zero. The pair M￿i-R￿i then acts as a
sequential monopoly as long as R￿i accepts the o⁄er received by M￿i.8
T=3. Ri chooses his e⁄ort and how much to produce, pays the corresponding ￿xed-fee and charges
the retail price speci￿ed in an RPM contract if any is in force.
Under both legal regimes, bilateral contracting is secret. Members of a given hierarchy cannot
observe the speci￿c trading rules speci￿ed in the contract ruling the competing hierarchy.9 The equi-
librium concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the added ￿passive beliefs￿re￿nement
(in short ￿ equilibrium￿ ). Provided Ri receives any unexpected o⁄er from Mi, he still believes that
R￿i produces the same equilibrium quantity. Under both legal regimes we shall look for symmetric,
pure strategies equilibria.
Technical assumptions. To deal with well-behaved programs under each regime, we develop
the analysis under the following hypothesis:






2 if ￿ ￿ 2￿
1+￿
2(1+￿￿￿) if ￿ < 2￿.
Assumption 1 rules out the possibility of having bunching and makes sure that output and
e⁄orts are increasing in ￿ for all pairs (￿;￿) 2 [￿1;1] ￿ [0;1].




2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
(2  + 1)(  (2 + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿))
:
Assumption 2 guarantees that the optimization programs that we solve under both legal regimes
feature positive e⁄orts and quantities for all demand realizations.
8In what follows, we focus on equilibria where both retailers remain active for all demand realizations which arises
when ￿￿ is su¢ ciently small.
9This assumption simpli￿es modeling by avoiding strategic considerations that would arise with public contracts
or even public commitment to either a RPM or a QF contract.
93 Benchmarks
To clarify the importance of both asymmetric information and interbrand competition for our
results, in this section we brie￿ y present the retail market equilibrium outcome when: (i) there is a
single monopolistic manufacturer/retailer pair; and (ii) there are two competing supply chains but
information about demand is common knowledge.
Bilateral monopoly. When ￿ = ￿ = 0 the model is similar to that studied in Martimort and
Piccolo (2007), who analyzed the welfare e⁄ect of RPM in a bilateral monopoly setting with asym-
metric information. With a quadratic disutility of e⁄ort, they show that vertical price control has
no impact on consumer surplus ￿ i.e., consumers are indi⁄erent between laissez-faire and a ban on
RPM. Our objective here is to study how this conclusion changes when both downstream product
market competition and non-market externalities are simultaneously at play.
Complete information with competing hierarchies. Consider ￿rst the case where the demand
shock ￿ is common knowledge. In this scenario, retail prices, quantities and downstream e⁄orts are
the same under both legal regimes and solve the following set of ￿rst-order conditions:
￿ + (1 + ￿)e￿(￿) ￿ (2 + ￿)q￿(￿) = 0; p￿(￿) = q￿(￿) =  e￿(￿) =
￿ 
  (2 + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
:
Whether a manufacturer lets his retailer choose his downstream e⁄ort or controls it through a
secret contract, the e⁄ort level remains the same thanks to the absence of any vertical external-
ity. When ￿xed-fees are allowed, there is no double marginalization and the retailer￿ s incentive to
provide e⁄ort can be easily aligned with that of the vertical structure he forms with the upstream
manufacturer. The marginal cost of e⁄ort must equal own market sales. Under complete informa-
tion, the choice of a legal regime has no impact on market allocations. We shall see that this is no
longer true under asymmetric information.
4 Asymmetric Information and Competing Supply Chains
Before starting the analysis it is worth emphasizing that downstream moral hazard has two di⁄erent
e⁄ects in our setting.
First, even when the retail price can be contracted upon, Mi cannot disentangle the impact of
the intercept parameter ￿ from his retailer￿ s e⁄ort ei on the residual demand the retailer faces. The
possibility that Ri claims that large sales are due to high e⁄ort although demand is low, even if in
reality these large sales result from a higher demand and less e⁄ort, forces Mi to give up information
rent to the retailer in order to induce information revelation. As a result, the second-best allocation
will feature downward distortions of both quantity and e⁄ort. The information rent, of course,
depends on the chosen contractual mode: a vertical contractual externality that is induced by
asymmetric information.
10Second, e⁄ort in enhancing own demand may have an impact on the competing brand￿ s de-
mand. RPM and QF may a⁄ect di⁄erently the demand faced by competing retailers: a horizontal
contractual externality.
4.1 Direct Revelation Mechanisms
Following Myerson (1982) and Martimort (1996), we use a version of the Revelation Principle in
competing hierarchies to characterize the set of incentive feasible allocations for each manufac-
turer/retailer pair. With bilateral secret contracts and for any output choice made by R￿i, there
is no loss of generality in looking for Mi￿ s best response to M￿i￿ s contractual o⁄er within the
class of direct and truthful mechanisms to characterize pure-strategy equilibria. Under QF, for





where ^ ￿i is Ri￿ s
report on the demand parameter. Similarly, if RPM is chosen, an incentive mechanism is of form n
ti(^ ￿i);qi(^ ￿i);pi(^ ￿i)
o
^ ￿i2￿
where the extra contracting variable pi(^ ￿i) denotes now the retail price
of good-i following report ^ ￿i.10
Note that a QF arrangement is less complete relative to RPM because it restricts the set of
screening instruments available to manufacturers by leaving the retail market price unspeci￿ed.
With a QF contract, the upstream manufacturer does not have enough instruments to control the
retailer￿ s e⁄ort. In contrast, by dictating the retail price and the quantity sold to the retailer, the
upstream manufacturer can control directly the retailer￿ s e⁄ort level under RPM.11
4.2 Laissez-faire
This section characterizes the equilibrium of the game under laissez-faire. As discussed before,
since contracts are unobservable, each manufacturer ￿nds it always optimal to use all contracting
variables irrespective of what the other manufacturer￿ s contract is. This leads to the following
10When manufacturers no longer control the level of ￿nal output sold in the market, but can only ￿x the retail price
in case of RPM, the analysis remains the same as if output was observable. The argument is formally developed in
Martimort and Piccolo (2007). The idea is that the optimal RPM mechanism reduces the input supply below what
would be optimal under complete information for screening purposes. Indeed, consider the output choice of each
retailer when instead the ￿nal quantity is non veri￿able. The retailer would ideally like to expand output up to the
point where the marginal bene￿t of one extra unit (the retail price) equals the marginal disutility of e⁄ort. Thus each
retailer would like to expand output above the second-best level implemented by our mechanism fti(:);qi(:);pi(:)g .
This implies that the retailers have no incentives to sell quantities lower than those supplied by the manufacturers.
Our mechanism is thus robust to the lack of veri￿ability of the ￿nal quantities sold by the retailers. Including the
quantity as an explicit contracting variables nevertheless eases presentation of our model.
11Even an RPM contract is incomplete. Indeed, a given manufacturer cannot contract on the output and retail
price chosen by rival hierarchies. The justi￿cation for this is that a given manufacturer may not have the auditing
rights to check out the sales of other retailers than his own or that the exact retail price charged by other retailers
includes non-observable rebates. It is worth noticing that, if such information on rivals￿output and retail price was
available, the logic of the mechanism design literature on implementation in complete information environment would
apply: a given manufacturer could achieve the ￿rst-best allocation just by matching his own retailer￿ s announcement
with what he learns indirectly from others￿choices. In such a world that boils down de facto to a perfect information
environment, there would be no di⁄erence between RPM and quantity forcing.
11preliminary result:
Lemma 1 In the laissez-faire regime, the equilibrium always features RPM.
Building on Lemma 1, we can easily characterize symmetric equilibria under laissez-faire by
means of optimality conditions that an RPM contract must satisfy at a best response. With an
RPM contract, the e⁄ort level is indirectly ￿xed as a function of ￿ through the inverse demand,
i.e., ei = pi + qi ￿ ￿e￿i + ￿q￿i ￿ ￿. Intuitively, RPM is less ￿ exible than QF simply because, when
retailer Ri faces a retail price target, he is indirectly forced to choose the e⁄ort level in a way that
might be suboptimal from his viewpoint.12




pi(^ ￿i)qi(^ ￿i) ￿ ￿(pi(^ ￿i) + qi(^ ￿i) ￿ ￿e￿i (￿) + ￿q￿i(￿) ￿ ￿) ￿ ti(^ ￿i)
o
:
Describing the set of incentive feasible allocations for the Mi-Ri pair is straightforward (see
the Appendix). Those allocations satisfy the following ￿rst- and second-order local conditions for
incentive compatibility:
_ Ui (￿) =  (1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿))ei(￿); (1)
(_ pi(￿) + _ qi(￿))(1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿)) > 0: (2)
Incentive feasible allocations must also satisfy the usual participation constraint:
Ui(￿) > 0; 8￿ 2 ￿: (3)
Equipped with this characterization, we now turn to the optimal contracting problem. Mi
designs a menu of contracts to maximize the expected fee he receives from Ri subject to the par-
ticipation and incentive compatibility constraints, together with the additional restriction in e⁄ort













i(￿) ￿ Ui (￿)
￿
d￿:
subject to (1), (2) and (3).
Assuming that the term 1+￿_ e￿i(￿)￿￿_ q￿i(￿) remains positive for all ￿ (a condition to be checked





 (1 + ￿_ e￿i(x) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(x))ei(x)dx: (4)
12See also Blair and Lewis (1994) and Martimort and Piccolo (2007) for similar arguments.
12With competing supply chains, the retailer￿ s information rent is not the same as that emerging
in a bilateral monopoly setting (the expression of the retailer￿ s rent in that latter case would be
obtained by simply setting ￿ = ￿ = 0 in the above equation). Remember that in a monopoly setting,
the retailer has some incentives to claim that demand is lower than what it really is. By doing so, the
fee he pays is lower and he can reduce his own e⁄ort while still selling the same quantity at the same
price. This (marginal) incentive to pretend demand is low is of course modi￿ed when competing
retailers do not deviate and still maintain their own e⁄ort and output. When ￿ > 0 (goods are
substitutes) or/and when ￿ < 0 (non-market externalities are negative), the residual demand that
the deviating retailer considers when evaluating the bene￿ts of such strategy is less steep, which
reduces his own incentives to claim demand is low. Intuitively, the more the rival produces of a
substitute good or the higher his e⁄ort in a sel￿sh environment, the lower are the retailer￿ s incentives
to claim that demand is low because less stakes can then be grabbed from the market by doing
so. Instead, when ￿ < 0 (goods are complements) or/and when ￿ > 0 (non-market externalities
are positive), the residual demand is steeper making the claim that demand is low more attractive.
More generally, since types are perfectly correlated, the incentives to underestimate demand of a
given retailer depend on the output and e⁄ort of his rival. Those competing-contracts e⁄ects are
now well-known from the existing literature since Martimort (1996) and Gal-Or (1999), although
they apply here in a framework with both market and non-market externalities.
Integrating by parts to evaluate the expected rent left to Ri and neglecting the second-order















(1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿))ei(￿))d￿:
At a best response to the schedule q￿i(￿) and e⁄ort e￿i (￿) implemented by the competing pair
M￿i-R￿i, the output qi (￿) and e⁄ort ei (￿) in Mi-Ri hierarchy are respectively given by the following
￿rst-order conditions obtained by pointwise optimization:13
qi(￿) = pi (￿) = ￿ + ei(￿) + ￿e￿i(￿) ￿ qi(￿) ￿ ￿q￿i(￿); (5)






(1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿))
￿
: (6)
Under RPM, the only variable which is really useful to reduce Ri￿ s information rent is his own
e⁄ort as one can see by inspection of (5) and (6). First, the marginal disutility of e⁄ort is lower
than the output; a downward distortion of e⁄ort with respect to the rule that would be followed
under complete information. Second, (5) implies that the pricing rule satis￿es the same expression
as under complete information. Output is produced according to the e¢ cient rule conditionally on
13Given Assumption 1, the objective is concave and these conditions are also su¢ cient.
13a given e⁄ort which is nevertheless distorted downward under asymmetric information.14 This leads
to the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Under laissez-faire, the pricing rule is e¢ cient. The e⁄ort is distorted for rent-extraction
purposes.
In a symmetric equilibrium where both manufacturers adopt RPM, the e⁄orts and outputs
satisfy the following system of di⁄erential equations:
(2 + ￿)qP(￿) = ￿ + eP(￿)(1 + ￿); (7)






(1 + ￿_ eP(￿) ￿ ￿_ qP(￿))
￿
; (8)
with boundary conditions qP(￿) = q￿(￿) and eP(￿) = e￿(￿), which state that there are no distortions
for the highest realization of demand.
Given the structure of these di⁄erential equations, we are now looking for a linear equilibrium
where both qP (￿) and eP (￿) are linear in ￿,15 so we have:





2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
; (9)
and
eP (￿) = e￿(￿) ￿




2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
: (10)
It is immediate to see that Assumption 1 ensures that the equilibrium e⁄ort and output are
monotonically increasing and satisfy the second-order condition (2). These schedules are downward
distorted with respect to the complete information outcome: qP (￿) ￿ q￿ (￿) and eP (￿) ￿ q￿ (￿) for
each ￿ (with equality at ￿ only). Moreover, Assumption 2 guarantees that these outputs and e⁄orts
remain non-negative.
4.3 Ban on RPM
When RPM is banned, manufacturers are bound to use QF contracts. Since an upstream manufac-
turer can no longer use the retail price, only sales can be used as a screening device. This has some
consequences both on allocative e¢ ciency ￿ the retailer being now free to choose e⁄ort ￿ and on
the distribution of information rent within each supply chain.
14This feature echoes the ￿dichotomy￿result underscored by La⁄ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 3) in some regulatory
environments.
15Martimort (1996) showed that the only symmetric equilibrium is linear when ￿ > 0 in a model without non-market
externalities.




￿ti(^ ￿i) + max
ei2R+
n
(￿ + ei + ￿e￿i(￿) ￿ qi(^ ￿i) ￿ ￿q￿i (￿))qi(^ ￿i) ￿ ￿(ei)
o￿
:
First, observe that the retailer￿ s chooses optimally his e⁄ort, that is:
qi (￿) =  ei (￿): (11)
This simple condition is the same as under complete information. It shows that now the agent fully
internalizes the impact of his e⁄ort choice on the overall pro￿t of vertical chain.
Incentive compatibility yields immediately the following local ￿rst- and second-order conditions:
_ Ui(￿) = (1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿))qi(￿); (12)
(1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿))_ qi(￿) > 0: (13)
Incentive feasible allocations must also satisfy the usual participation constraint (3).













i(￿) ￿ Ui (￿)
￿
d￿
subject to (11), (12), (13) and (3).
Assuming that 1+￿_ e￿i(￿)￿￿_ q￿i(￿) remains positive for all ￿ ￿ a condition to be also checked




(1 + ￿_ e￿i(x) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(x))qi(x)dx: (14)
Again, the retailer￿ s rent depends on the steepness of its rival￿ s e⁄ort and output and it does exactly
as under RPM as it can be seen from replacing qi(x) with  ei(x) into (14) and identifying with the
expression of the rent given under RPM in (4).
Integrating by parts the expression of the expected rent left to Ri and neglecting the second-order
















(1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿))qi(￿))d￿
subject to (11).








(1 + ￿_ e￿i(￿) ￿ ￿_ q￿i(￿)) = 0: (15)
In contrast with the laissez-faire regime, e⁄ort is now chosen e¢ ciently by the retailer. Indeed,
the retailer fully internalizes the impact of his e⁄ort choice on the downstream pro￿t: he oversupplies
e⁄ort relative to RPM (everything else being equal). Still, the ￿rst-order condition (15) shows that
output must be downward distorted for rent extraction purposes. For any given quantity speci￿ed
by the direct revelation mechanism QF, Ri gains ￿ exibility under a quantity-￿xing arrangement
since he chooses now optimally his e⁄ort level. More speci￿cally, while choosing the optimal e⁄ort
level, the retailer does not internalize the impact of his e⁄ort on the information rent given up by the
upstream manufacturer. Asymmetric information introduces de facto a vertical externality between
the manufacturer and his retailer which is induced by the choice of a QF regime. Summarizing, we
can state:
Lemma 3 When RPM is banned, the retailer￿ s level of e⁄ort is chosen e¢ ciently conditionally on
the equilibrium output. The output is downward distorted for rent-extraction reasons.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the output schedule is described by the following system of di⁄er-
ential equations:




(1 + ￿_ eQ(￿) ￿ ￿_ qQ(￿)); (16)
qQ(￿) =  eQ(￿); (17)
with the boundary conditions qQ(￿) = q￿(￿) and eQ(￿) = e￿(￿) ￿ i.e., there is again no distortion
for the highest level of demand. Again, looking for the (unique) linear equilibrium, we obtain:








2  (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿)
;
and








2  (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿)
:
When Assumption 1 holds, the equilibrium e⁄ort and output are below their complete infor-
mation levels: qQ (￿) ￿ q￿ (￿) and eQ (￿) ￿ e￿ (￿) for each ￿ (with equality at ￿ only) and the
second-order condition (13) holds. Similarly, with Assumption 2, the equilibrium output and e⁄ort
remain non-negative.
165 Comparative Statics and Consumer Welfare
The goal of this section is to describe the impact of the two legal regimes characterized above on
consumers. As will soon become clear, the comparison of the levels of e⁄ort in both regimes is a
key driver of our results.
Proposition 1 A ban on RPM spurs the equilibrium e⁄ort relative to laissez-faire.
To explain that RPM reduces the equilibrium e⁄ort relative to the laissez-faire regime, remember
that under QF retailers fully internalize the impact of their e⁄orts in improving own demand and
downstream pro￿t: a demand-enhancing e⁄ect. Under RPM, a given manufacturer is better able
to infer his retailer￿ s non-market activities by looking at the observed price and the quantities of
intermediate goods sold to that retailer. The retailer no longer fully internalizes the impact of his
e⁄ort￿ s contribution on downstream pro￿t and the demand-enhancing e⁄ect disappears which leads
to less provision of the non-veri￿able e⁄ort.
Instead, the ranking of equilibrium quantities turns out to be ambiguous.
Proposition 2 A ban on RPM spurs the equilibrium quantity relative to laissez-faire if e⁄ort has
a cooperative value (￿ > 0), and the opposite is true otherwise (￿ < 0). Both legal regimes deliver
the same quantities if there are no e⁄ort externalities (￿ = 0).
A ban on RPM has the following e⁄ects on the equilibrium quantity. First, as just explained,
for any given output level, each retailer Ri will exert more e⁄ort under QF relative to RPM: a
demand-enhancing e⁄ect which increases quantities. Second, since ￿nal output is the only screening
instrument available under QF, each manufacturer Mi reduces it downward for rent extraction
reasons: a rent-extraction e⁄ect. Finally, because e⁄ort generates demand spillovers, the output of
R￿i is shifted upward when e⁄orts have a cooperative value and downward when they are sel￿sh:
a horizontal externality e⁄ect.
When there are no externalities (￿ = 0) the horizontal externality e⁄ect is absent. The demand-
enhancing and the rent-extraction e⁄ects exactly compensate each other in this environment with
a quadratic disutility of e⁄ort and linear demand, exactly as in Martimort and Piccolo (2007).
Roughly, a manufacturer who can control both the retail price and the quantity sold by his retailer
keeps some indirect control over the retailer￿ s e⁄ort. Putting a ban on RPM forces a manufacturer
to give up any such control. As a result, the retailer increases his e⁄ort to boost own demand
and therefore enjoys a higher information rent. Anticipating this demand-enhancing e⁄ect, the
manufacturer further reduces output for rent-extraction reason, in such a way that these two e⁄ects
just compensate each other precisely when there are no non-market externalities.
Hence, as long as ￿ is di⁄erent from 0, the di⁄erence between quantities in the two legal regimes
is determined only by the horizontal externality e⁄ect. When e⁄ort is cooperative a ban on RPM
stimulates production since it magni￿es the positive externalities between retailers ￿ i.e., increasing
17the e⁄ort of one retailer leads his opponent to increase his own e⁄ort as well because the game
features strategic complementarities in e⁄ort. The increase in e⁄orts then boosts own demand and
thus leads to a higher equilibrium quantity. The opposite obtains with negative externalities.
Building on these results we now study whether the Chicago School argument, which claims
that RPM should be lawful per se, is still vindicated under asymmetric information and competing
hierarchies. This approach takes as main welfare criterion consumer surplus16 and its basic economic
insight rests on the following simple idea: as long as manufacturers choose to control retail prices,
consumers cannot be hurt because upstream pro￿t maximization necessarily requires avoiding any
source of double marginalization.
This conjecture has been con￿rmed by Gal-Or (1991a) in a related model that entails a single
manufacturer/retailer pair, also adverse selection but no moral hazard. When there is no moral
hazard downstream, contracting on price and quantities through RPM allows manufacturers to
infer perfectly the value of demand and to enforce de facto the complete information outcome.
In such a model, consumers prefer a laissez-faire regime as well. This is because, in the absence
of vertical price control, prices would be excessively high owing to the input supply distortions
induced by asymmetric information. The results of Gal-Or (1991a)￿ s model can be easily obtained
in our framework also by making e⁄ort in￿nitely costly; the limiting case where   gets to in￿nity.
Summarizing, we get:
Lemma 4 (Extension of Gal-Or, 1991a) When retailers do not exert e⁄ort, manufacturers ex-
tract all information rent from retailers with RPM. A laissez-faire regime always makes consumers
better o⁄ relative to a ban on RPM.
When manufacturers cannot control retail prices, the standard rent extraction/e¢ ciency trade-
o⁄ drives prices up for screening reasons. The quantity is downward distorted and consumers are
worse o⁄ relative to laissez-faire which delivers the complete information outcome.
Yet, when the retailers￿e⁄ort becomes important, the above prediction is no longer true. Al-
though manufacturers ￿nd it a dominant strategy to choose RPM whenever it is allowed, double
marginalization remains with RPM as shown in the ￿rst-order conditions (8) and (16). Moreover,
this double marginalization increases (resp. decreases) when retail non-market externalities are
positive (resp. negative). The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 3 A ban on RPM harms consumers if e⁄ort has a sel￿sh value (￿ < 0), and the
converse is true in the cooperative case (￿ > 0). If there are no e⁄ort externalities (￿ = 0)
consumers are indi⁄erent between the two legal regimes.
The economic intuition of this result is straightforward. First, consumers￿well-being is only
shaped by retailers￿output supply. Second, as shown in Proposition 3, the sign of e⁄ort externalities
16Many scholars have indeed advocated that the sole role of Antitrust policies should be to promote consumers￿
surplus. See Bork (1978, Chapter 2, pp. 51) for instance.
18is key to sign the di⁄erence between equilibrium quantities under the two legal regimes. As discussed
earlier, positive externalities between retailers might describe instances where e⁄ort captures pre-sale
services or generic advertising as information on the product￿ s existence bene￿ts also competitors.
In these cases forbidding RPM increases consumer surplus because it leads to higher aggregate
e⁄ort which, in turn, encourages retailers to expand production. Di⁄erently, indivisible services
bundled with the ￿nal product might capture the case of negative externalities. In these instances
retail price restrictions would bene￿t consumers because they mitigate the ￿ business stealing e⁄ect￿
that works through the retail promotional and advertising channel, which is precisely what limits
retailers￿equilibrium production choices in a regime forbidding vertical control.
It is interesting to notice that per se rules would be suboptimal in our model. One might in fact
wonder whether manufacturers and consumers have congruent preferences over contractual regimes
in the set-up developed above. Speci￿cally, is it possible to show that whenever manufacturers
jointly prefer laissez-faire to a ban on RPM, consumers also prefer the laissez-faire regime and vice
versa? Next proposition shows that this is not typically true. There exists a non empty region of
parameters where a laissez-faire policy would fail to maximize consumers surplus.
Proposition 4 Manufacturers￿and consumers￿preferences are not always aligned over legal regimes.
In particular, when consumers prefer a ban on RPM (￿ > 0) manufacturers would jointly gain from
vertical price control if ￿ is not too large.
This result suggests that the conclusions about the desirability of a laissez-faire attitude in
environments with asymmetric information should be at least taken with a word of caution with
competing vertical chains and when retailers exert non-market externalities one on another. The
fact that manufacturers prefer RPM for ￿ positive and not too large hinges on the simple idea that
whatever other supply chains are doing and whether these pairs are using RPM or not, a given
manufacturer would always want to expand the means of controlling his retailer, so as to limit his
information rent. Using both controls ￿ i.e., on retail price and output ￿ allows indeed to better
track the retailer￿ s e⁄ort that, in turn, sti￿ es his rent. When comparing equilibrium pro￿ts with and
without a ban on RPM, this e⁄ect is of ￿rst magnitude. Even though the contract o⁄ered by the
competing pair changes as we compare legal regimes, this e⁄ect drives the manufacturers￿preferences
over legal regimes when the pro￿t enhancing e⁄ect of the positive non-market externalities (that is
ampli￿ed under a ban on RPM) is negligible ￿ i.e., when ￿ is not too large.
6 Conclusion
We developed a simple model of competing supply chains with asymmetric information to show that
downstream non-market externalities can play an important role in determining the welfare e⁄ects
of di⁄erent legal approaches towards RPM. Our results undermine the view that vertical price ￿xing
sti￿ es double marginalization when retailers have privileged information relative to manufacturers.
19Although developed in a very speci￿c setting, our results are robust to a number of extensions.
First, our predictions remain qualitatively the same with: (i) nonlinear demands and small uncer-
tainty, or (ii) non-uniform distributions of demand shocks and small support of types. Indeed, our
results would be obtained in the limiting case where Taylor expansions are valid.
Second, as explained in the Appendix, although we focused on substitute goods, our results go
through with complements ￿ i.e., when ￿ < 0. Indeed, the existence of linear equilibria in both
contractual regimes does not rely on the sign of the market externalities.17 Neither the output
comparisons between the two regimes nor the welfare comparison change.
Third, introducing intrabrand competition simpli￿es signi￿cantly the analysis but it also voids
it of its interest. Indeed, if di⁄erent retailers sell the same product on behalf of a given manufacturer
and face the same demand ￿ i.e., there is no exclusive territories constraint ￿ the latter can use
the reports of those two retailers on their common demand to cross-check their announcements in
the tradition of the implementation literature. Each manufacturer could thereby extract all surplus
from each retailer and implement the complete information outcome. This is so irrespective of the
contractual mode. The question of whether RPM should be banned or not is not even relevant (at
least from a theoretical viewpoint).
Finally, consider the possibility that each retailer contracts with both manufacturers at the
same time ￿ i.e., common agency. Although such an extension is beyond the scope of the paper,
some interesting considerations can be made already here without being too speci￿c about the
game form that induces such complex contractual arrangements. Martimort (1996) shows that
when goods are substitutes (￿ > 0) both principals would prefer to have exclusive dealings rather
than contracting with a common agent, in this case our analysis would not change. By contrast,
if goods are complements (￿ < 0), dealing with a common agent might be preferred to exclusive
dealing contracts. Is our mechanism still at play in such cases? The answer to this question
typically depends on the type of equilibria that emerge ￿ e.g., equilibria where only one retailer is
active with both manufacturers or those where both retailers are active and each deals with both
manufacturers. In the ￿rst case, we do believe that our insights would, to some extent, carry over.
Contracting on retail price has to reduce the e⁄ort for rent-extraction reasons even in a common
agency model and this reduction in e⁄ort will impact the produced quantity through non-market
externalities. Clearly, there might be also other forces at play, but our conjecture is that the sign
of the non-market externalities will be still relevant to study the impact of vertical price control on
consumers. Equilibria where both retailers are active and each deals with both principals are likely
to be easily characterized because, again, under the hypothesis of perfect correlation between types,
each manufacturer can fully extract the retailers￿rent by pitting one retailer against the other at
the revelation stage. This would lead again to the uninteresting case of complete information so as
17As shown in Martimort (1996) in a related model, there may exist a continuum of symmetric of equilibria with
nonlinear outputs in the case of complements but only the linear one is robust to signi￿cant perturbations of the
spread of demand uncertainty.
20to void the question addressed by the paper of its interest.
In conclusion, although we acknowledge that introducing RPM in a common agency framework
could severely complicate the analysis, our conjecture is that the non-market externality channel
will still matter in the welfare analysis. We hope to address these questions more carefully in future
research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is immediate from the text. ￿
Market equilibrium with laissez-faire. Using (7) and (8), di⁄erentiating w.r.t. ￿ we obtain:
_ qP =
2 
2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
and _ eP =
2  + 1
2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
; (18)
monotonicity is then guaranteed under Assumption 1 since _ qP > 0 and _ eP > 0 if
  >
1 + ￿
2(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
:
Using (18) we then obtain:
1 + ￿_ eP ￿ ￿_ qP =
(1 + 2￿)(2  ￿ 1)
2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
;
which is positive when Assumption 1 holds.
Now, the slope of the complete information allocation is:
_ q￿ =
 
 (2 + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
and _ e￿ =
1
 (2 + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)
;
with _ q￿ > 0 and _ e￿ > 0 since   > (1 + ￿)=(2 + ￿) by Assumption 1. Moreover, notice that since
qP(￿) = q￿(￿), the inequality _ qP > _ q￿ must imply qP(￿) ￿ q￿(￿) for all ￿ ￿ ￿ with equality at ￿
only. Simple algebra in fact yields:
_ qP ￿ _ q￿ =
(2  ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) 
( (2 + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿))(2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿))
;
which directly delivers the result since, from Assumption 1, we have   > 1=2. By using the same
argument, one also has eP(￿) ￿ e￿(￿) for all ￿ ￿ ￿ with equality at ￿ only. Finally, notice that for ￿￿
small enough (i.e., Assumption 2), e⁄ort and output are positive. Showing that, under Assumption
1, the global incentive constraint is met follows the arguments developed in Martimort (1996) and
will be thus omitted.
21Note that this characterization does not depend on ￿, so it remains true also if goods are
complements under Assumption 1 ￿ i.e., ￿ < 0. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows from the expressions of qP (￿) and eP (￿). ￿
Market equilibrium with ban on RPM. Di⁄erentiating (16) and (17) w.r.t. ￿ one obtains:
_ qQ =
2 
2 (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿)
and _ eQ =
2
2 (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿)
,
which satisfy the monotonicity condition since, by Assumption 1,   > 1+2￿
2(1+￿):
Also observe that
1 + ￿_ eQ ￿ ￿_ qQ =
2  ￿ 1
2  (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿)
> 0;
when Assumption 1 holds. Moreover, simple algebra yields:
_ qQ ￿ _ q￿ =
(2  ￿ 1) 
(2 (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿))( (2 + ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿))
> 0;
and the same logic used before immediately implies qQ(￿) ￿ q￿(￿) for all ￿ with equality at ￿ only.
A similar argument allows to verify that eQ(￿) ￿ e￿(￿) for all ￿ with equality at ￿ only. Finally, P
Q
i
has interior solutions whenever ￿￿ is small enough, that is, under Assumption 2. Global incentive
compatibility can be proved as in Martimort (1996).
Again, this characterization does not change with complements under Assumption 1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof follows from the expressions of qQ (￿) and eQ (￿). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking the di⁄erence between eQ (￿) and eP (￿), one gets:
eQ (￿) ￿ eP (￿) =




(2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿))(2 (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿))
; 8 ￿ 2 ￿;
which immediately proves the result since   > 1=2 when Assumption 1 holds. Note that the sign
of the above expression does not depend on ￿ under Assumption 1, so the result remains true also
if goods are complements ￿ i.e., ￿ < 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Taking the di⁄erence between qQ (￿) and qP (￿), one gets:
qQ (￿) ￿ qP (￿) =




(2 (1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + 2￿))(2  (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 + ￿))
; 8 ￿ 2 ￿:
which immediately proves the result since   > 1=2 when Assumption 1 holds. Note that the sign
of the above expression does not depend on ￿ under Assumption 1, so the result remains true also
if goods are complements ￿ i.e., ￿ < 0. ￿
22Proof of Lemma 4. Observe that, when   goes to +1, we obtain qP (￿) = q￿ (￿) and eP (￿) =
e￿ (￿) = 0 for all ￿. Hence, RPM allows to achieve the complete information outcome in each
manufacturer/retailer hierarchy. The result then follows immediately. ￿














i ￿ ￿q1q2 + I:
It is immediate to derive the consumer surplus when his type is ￿ as
Cs(￿) = (1 + ￿)[qs(￿)]
2 ; where s 2 fQ;Pg;
then, taking expectations over ￿ and using Proposition 2 yields the result. Again since the result
in Proposition 2 does not depend on the sign of ￿ under Assumption 1. Hence, also this result does
not depend on whether goods are complements or substitutes. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. To show this result it is enough to verify that there exists a non-empty






























(1 + ￿_ eQ(￿) ￿ ￿_ qQ(￿))qQ(￿)
￿
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then, assuming ￿ = 0 ￿ i.e., no externality, one immediately obtains:
￿P ￿ ￿Q￿ ￿
￿=0 =
 ￿￿2 (2  ￿ 1)
2
6(2 (1 + ￿) ￿ 1)
2 > 0: (19)
Since the di⁄erence ￿P ￿ ￿Q is continuous in ￿, this implies that manufacturers would jointly
prefer a regime with laissez-faire in a neighborhood of ￿ = 0, hence also for ￿ positive but not too
large. But, as seen in Proposition 3, consumers strictly prefer a ban on RPM for ￿ > 0. Hence the
result on their con￿ icting preferences.
Note also that the sign of (19) does not depend on ￿, so the result remains true also for com-
plements ￿ i.e., ￿ < 0. ￿
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